Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295845 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16822
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We study the effect of diminishing search frictions in markets with adverse selection by presenting a model in which agents with private information can simultaneously contact multiple trading partners. We highlight a new trade- off: facilitating contacts reduces coordination frictions but also the ability to screen agents' types. We find that, when agents can contact sufficiently many trading partners, fully separating equilibria obtain only if adverse selection is sufficiently severe. When this condition fails, equilibria feature partial pooling and multiple equilibria co-exist. In the limit, as the number of contacts becomes large, some of the equilibria converge to the competitive outcomes of Akerlof (1970), including Pareto-dominated ones; other pooling equilibria continue to feature frictional trade in the limit, where entry is inefficiently high. Our findings provide a basis to assess the effects of recent technological innovations that have made meetings easier.
Subjects: 
search
adverse selection
information frictions
efficiency
JEL: 
D82
D83
J64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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