Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295863 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16840
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We study how job-seekers share information about jobs within their social network, and its implications for firms. We randomly increase the amount of competition for a job and find that job-seekers are less likely to share information about the job with their high ability peers. This lowers the quality of applicants, hires, and performance on the job - suggesting that firms who disseminate job information through social networks may see lower quality applicants than expected for their most competitive positions. While randomly offering higher wages attracts better talent, it is not able to fully overcome these strategic disincentives in information sharing.
Subjects: 
job information
social networks
labor markets
JEL: 
L14
M51
O12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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