Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295863 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16840
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study how job-seekers share information about jobs within their social network, and its implications for firms. We randomly increase the amount of competition for a job and find that job-seekers are less likely to share information about the job with their high ability peers. This lowers the quality of applicants, hires, and performance on the job - suggesting that firms who disseminate job information through social networks may see lower quality applicants than expected for their most competitive positions. While randomly offering higher wages attracts better talent, it is not able to fully overcome these strategic disincentives in information sharing.
Schlagwörter: 
job information
social networks
labor markets
JEL: 
L14
M51
O12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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