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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10905
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs) — a range of methods to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere— are a crucial innovation in meeting temperature targets set by international climate agreements. However, mechanisms which undo the adverse consequences of short-sighted actions (as NETs) can fuel substitution effects and crowd out virtuous behaviors (e.g., mitigation efforts). For this reason, the impact of NETs on environmental preservation is an open question among scientists and policy-makers. We model this problem through a novel restorable common-pool resource game and use a laboratory experiment to exogenously manipulate key features of NETs and assess their consequences. We show that crowding out only emerges when NETs are surely available and cheap. The availability of NETs does not allow experimental communities to either conserve the common resource for longer or accrue higher earnings and makes the earnings distribution more unequal.
Schlagwörter: 
climate crisis
environmental sustainability
carbon dioxide removal
common-pool resource
free-rider problem
laboratory experiment
JEL: 
C92
H41
Q55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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