Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296010 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10921
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Governments increasingly use changes in tax rules to combat evasion. We develop a general approach to point-identify tax compliance along with supply and demand elasticities; identification requires data on prices and quantities before and after changes in tax enforcement and a demand or supply shifter. We illustrate our approach using data on Airbnb collection agreements, where full enforcement is achieved by shifting the tax burden away from hosts to renters via the platform. We find that taxes are paid on roughly zero to 3.5 percent of Airbnb transactions prior to enforcement.
Subjects: 
tax evasion
compliance
statutory incidence
tax invariance
Airbnb
sharing economy
voluntary collection agreements
JEL: 
H20
H22
H26
L10
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.