Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296083 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10994
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This study explores the welfare impact of personalized pricing for consumers in a duopolistic two-sided market, with consumers single-homing and developers affiliating with a platform according to their outside option. Personalized pricing, which is private in nature, cannot influence expectations regarding the network sizes, inducing the platforms to offer lower participation fees for developers. Those lower fees increase network benefits for consumers, allowing the platforms to exploit these benefits through personalized pricing. Personalized prices are higher when the network value for developers is high, benefiting competing platforms at the expense of consumers. These findings offer policy insights on personalized pricing.
Subjects: 
personalized pricing
uniform prices
two-sided market
content developers
JEL: 
L13
D43
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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