Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296107 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11018
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This chapter provides a description of one of the key anti-tax-avoidance rules to combat profit shifting by multinational corporations, so called Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules that directly target income in low-tax countries. We explain some key institutional features of CFC provisions. We then present some data and descriptive statistics before we review existing theoretical and empirical research analyzing CFC rules. Our review also includes the new U.S. GILTI rules. CFC rules are effective in curbing profit shifting, but their effect on the real economy is still unclear. In contrast, GILTI seems to be ineffective when it comes to profit shifting, but it has consequences for real activity. We finally argue that research on CFC regulations and GILTI can be informative in assessing the recent global minimum tax initiative.
Schlagwörter: 
Controlled-foreign-company (CFC) Rules
Global Intangible Low-taxed Income (GILTI)
tax havens
tax avoidance
effects of regulation
global minimum tax
JEL: 
H25
F23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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