Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296129 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11040
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material payoff obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined probability. They are assumed to act morally w.r.t. both membership and emissions. We investigate the interaction and impact of that moral behavior on coalition formation and material payoff. The membership morality tends to increase while the emissions morality tends to decrease the coalition size, but the outcome is not smoothly determined by these opposite forces.
Subjects: 
IEA
stability
homo moralis
emissions morality
membership morality
JEL: 
C72
Q50
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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