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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11040
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material payoff obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined probability. They are assumed to act morally w.r.t. both membership and emissions. We investigate the interaction and impact of that moral behavior on coalition formation and material payoff. The membership morality tends to increase while the emissions morality tends to decrease the coalition size, but the outcome is not smoothly determined by these opposite forces.
Schlagwörter: 
IEA
stability
homo moralis
emissions morality
membership morality
JEL: 
C72
Q50
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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