Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296248 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 306
Verlag: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
I study a central authority's ability to commit to a publicly announced mechanism in a one-to-one agent-object matching model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An agent's observation in form of the final matching has an innocent explanation (Akbarpour and Li, 2020), if given the agent's reported preferences, there is a combination with other agents' preferences leading to an identical observation under the announced mechanism. The authority can only commit up to safe deviations (Akbarpour and Li, 2020)-mechanisms that produce only observations with innocent explanations. For efficient or stable announcements, I show that no safe deviation exists if and only if the announced mechanism is dictatorial. I establish that the Deferred Acceptance (DA) Mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962) implies commitment to stability. Finally, I show that group strategy-proof and efficient announcements allow commitment to efficiency only if they are dictatorial.
Schlagwörter: 
Matching
Transparency
Partial Commitment
Strategy-Proof
Stability
Efficiency
DA
TTC
JEL: 
C78
D47
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
611.67 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.