Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296362 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 521-537
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first of these relations is used to pare down the set of the feasible alternatives into a shortlist while the second is used to make a final choice from the shortlist. Rules in this class are characterized by four properties: two classical rationality requirements (Sen's expansion consistency and Manzini and Mariotti's weak WARP); and adaptations of two classical collective choice requirements (Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives and Saari and Barney's no preference reversal bias). These rules also satisfy some other desirable properties, including an adaptation of May's positive responsiveness.
Subjects: 
Majority rule
decisiveness
IIA
monotonicity
rational shortlist methods
JEL: 
D71
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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