Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296368 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 687-724
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one must establish which agents are allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static markets: an agent’s payoff from remaining unmatched cannot be defined independently of what other contemporaneous agents’ outcomes are. Dynamically stable matchings always exist. Dynamic stability is a necessary condition to ensure timely participation in the economy by ensuring that agents do not strategically delay the time at which they are available to match.
Subjects: 
Dynamic stability
dynamic matching
stable matching
non-transferable utility
externalities
credibility
market design
dynamic arrivals
aftermarkets
JEL: 
D47
C78
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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