Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296383 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1183-1223
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one party learns the truth, the other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of disclosure being reciprocated -- the quid pro quo motive -- or from the possibility of learning from the rival's failure to act in response to a disclosure -- the screening motive. Alternating and gradual disclosures are generally indispensable for information exchange and the number of disclosure rounds grows without bound if the agents' initial information becomes sufficiently diffuse -- in that sense, the less informed agents are the more they talk. Patient individuals can achieve efficiency by means of continuous alternating disclosures of limited amounts of information. This provides a rationale for protracted dialogues.
Subjects: 
Alternating information disclosure
dynamic communication
two-sided incomplete information
JEL: 
C72
C73
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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