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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1269-1312
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
I study endogenous learning dynamics for people who misperceive intertemporal correlations in random sequences. Biased agents face an optimal-stopping problem. They are uncertain about the underlying distribution and learn its parameters from predecessors. Agents stop when early draws are "good enough," so predecessors' experiences contain negative streaks but not positive streaks. When agents wrongly expect systematic reversals (the "gambler's fallacy"), they understate the likelihood of consecutive below-average draws, converge to over-pessimistic beliefs about the distribution's mean, and stop too early. Agents uncertain about the distribution's variance overestimate it to an extent that depends on predecessors' stopping thresholds. I also analyze how other misperceptions of intertemporal correlation interact with endogenous data censoring.
Schlagwörter: 
Berk-Nash equilibrium
endogenous data censoring
fictitious variation
gambler's fallacy
Misspecified learning
JEL: 
D83
D91
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