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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1683-1717
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1977, 1999) but allow for the use of lotteries and monetary transfers as in Abreu and Matsushima (1992, 1994). We unify the two well-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches in full implementation theory. We show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for (exact) mixed-strategy Nash implementation by a finite mechanism. In contrast to previous papers, our approach possesses the following features: finite mechanisms (with no integer or modulo game) are used; mixed strategies are handled explicitly; neither undesirable outcomes nor transfers occur in equilibrium; the size of transfers can be made arbitrarily small; and our mechanism is robust to information perturbations.
Schlagwörter: 
Complete information
full implementation
information perturbations
Maskin monotonicity
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
social choice function
JEL: 
C72
D78
D82
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