Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296404 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 37-63
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matching exists in a discrete matching market when firms' preference profile satisfies a unimodularity condition that is compatible with various forms of complementarities. We provide a class of firms' preference profiles that satisfy the unimodularity condition.
Subjects: 
complementarity
demand type
integer programming
many-to-one matching
stability
total unimodularity
Two-sided matching
JEL: 
C61
C78
D47
D63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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