Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296406 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 97-127
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes a guarantee takes the form of a probability distribution over the ranks from 1 to p. If n≥p the uniform lottery is shown to be the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee. If n<p, combining (variants of) the familiar random dictator and voting by veto mechanisms yields a large family of maximal guarantees: it is exhaustive if n=2 and almost so if p≤2n. Voting rules à la Condorcet or Borda, even in probabilistic form, are ruled out by our worst case viewpoint.
Subjects: 
guarantees
random dictator
voting by veto
Worst case
JEL: 
D63
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.