Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296407 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 129-162
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a `sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel `viscosity' dynamic programming principle, we characterise the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.
Subjects: 
constrained
dynamic
gradual
information
Persuasion
viscosity
JEL: 
C61
C65
C73
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
170.42 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.