Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296416 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 463-479
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus, desirable properties of ex post implementation such as informational robustness become difficult to achieve when preference interdependence and preference heterogeneity are both present in the environment.
Subjects: 
collective decision-making
Ex post implementation
informational robustness
interdependent values
mechanism design
nontransferable utility
JEL: 
D82
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.