Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296417 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 481-502
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games, and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at "ties." These games include a general version of all-pay contests, first-prize auctions with common values, and Hotelling models with incomplete information.
Subjects: 
better-reply security
discontinuous games
Equilibrium existence
JEL: 
D82
D44
C72
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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