Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296419 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 529-559
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a class of dynamic models that capture subjective (and hence unobservable) constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can acquire, pay attention to, or absorb, via an Information Choice Process (ICP). An ICP specifies the information that can be acquired about the payoff-relevant state in the current period, and how this choice affects what can be learned in the future. In spite of their generality, wherein ICPs can accommodate any dependence of the information constraint on the history of information choices and state realizations, we show that the constraints imposed by them are identified up to a dynamic extension of Blackwell dominance. All the other parameters of the model are also uniquely identified.
Schlagwörter: 
dynamic Blackwell dominance
Dynamic preferences
information choice process
rational inattention
subjective Markov decision process
JEL: 
D80
D81
D90
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
399.88 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.