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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 561-596
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
I analyze sequential auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders who have independent private values and unit demand. Equilibrium bids are history dependent and subject to a discouragement effect: the higher the winning bid in the current round is, the less aggressive the bids of the remaining bidders in the next round. Moreover, because they experience a loss in each round in which they fail to obtain an object, bidders are willing to pay a premium in order to win sooner rather than later. This desire to win earlier leads prices to decline in equilibrium. I also show how various disclosure policies regarding the outcome of earlier auctions affect equilibrium bids, and that sequential and simultaneous auctions are neither bidder-payoff equivalent nor revenue equivalent.
Schlagwörter: 
afternoon effect
Loss aversion
sequential auctions
JEL: 
D03
D44
D81
D82
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