Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296428 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 885-916
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The buyer is privately informed about her valuation, and the seller privately observes her stochastically changing cost of delivering the good. Prices fall gradually at the early stages of negotiations, and trade is inefficiently delayed. The first-best is implementable via a mechanism, whereas all equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining game are inefficient.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Coase conjecture
evolving private information
inefficient delay
two-sided private information
JEL: 
C73
C78
D42
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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