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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 917-940
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider collective decision making when society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a technique for asymptotic analysis and show Pareto dominance of the proportional rule.
Schlagwörter: 
prisoner's dilemma
proportional rule
Representative democracy
winner-take-all rule
JEL: 
C72
D70
D72
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