Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296431 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 965-991
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their level of manipulability. This ranking sheds a new light on practical design decisions such as the design of the entry-level medical labor market in the US, and school admissions systems in New York, Chicago, Denver and many cities in Ghana and in the UK.
Schlagwörter: 
college admissions
manipulability
Market design
school choice
two-sided matching
JEL: 
C78
D47
D78
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
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