Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296433 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1023-1061
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Subjects: 
division problems
Obvious strategy-proofness
sequential allotment rules
single-peaked preferences
JEL: 
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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