Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296437 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1181-1223
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments.
Subjects: 
Costly inclusion
free-rider problem
Groves mechanism
labor markets
pivot mechanism
Vickrey auction
JEL: 
D82
D47
D24
D44
H41
D61
D63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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