Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296445 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1475-1509
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.
Subjects: 
Bayes' correlated equilibrium
communication equilibrium
information design
information structures
Multistage games
revelation principle
sequential communication equilibrium
JEL: 
C73
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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