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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1511-1546
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker - a comparative statics effect which is reminiscent of Braess's paradox in transportation economics. Finally, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibria of two variations of the model: one where all nodes cooperate in interception and one where nodes update their beliefs and make inspection decisions upon observing the arrival of a suspicious object.
Schlagwörter: 
attack and defense
inspection games
Network interdiction
networks
JEL: 
D85
C72
K42
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