Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296451 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1711-1757
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment and characterize the firms' payoffs. Firms fall into one of two categories: some firms must obtain the same payoff as they would in static stable matchings, and this holds at every patience level; meanwhile, repetition and history dependence can enlarge the set of sustainable payoffs for the other firms, provided that the firms are sufficiently patient. In large matching markets with correlated preferences, the first kind of firms corresponds to ``elite'' firms that make up at most a vanishingly small fraction of the market. The vast majority of firms fall into the second category.
Subjects: 
Gale-Shapley
matching
repeated games
stability
JEL: 
C71
C72
C73
C78
D47
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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