Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296457 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 169-206
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments, marketing, and R&D races. To understand this influence, we study a general class of asymmetric, two-player all-pay auctions where we allow for spillovers in each player's reward. The link between participants' efforts and rewards yields novel effects -- in particular, players with higher costs and lower values than their opponent sometimes extract larger payoffs.
Subjects: 
All-pay
auctions
contests
spillovers
war of attrition
JEL: 
C65
C72
D44
D62
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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