Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296458 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 207-244
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests and discuss the limit to perfectly competitive outcomes under different disclosure rules.
Subjects: 
Contest design
oligopoly
public goods
R&D
rent-seeking
JEL: 
C72
C73
D72
D82
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.