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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 207-244
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests and discuss the limit to perfectly competitive outcomes under different disclosure rules.
Schlagwörter: 
Contest design
oligopoly
public goods
R&D
rent-seeking
JEL: 
C72
C73
D72
D82
D74
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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