Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296494 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
GLO Discussion Paper No. 1441
Verlag: 
Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen
Zusammenfassung: 
We evaluate a political reform in Portugal that introduced individual teacher performancerelated pay and tournaments in public schools. We find that the focus on individual performance decreased student achievement, as measured in national exams, and increased grade inflation. The results follow from a difference-in-differences analysis of matched student-school panels and two complementary control groups: public schools in regions that were exposed to lighter reforms; and private schools, whose teachers had their incentives unchanged. Students in public schools with a higher proportion of teachers exposed to the tournament also perform worse. Overall, our results highlight the potential social costs from disruption of cooperation amongst public sector workers due to competition for promotions.
Schlagwörter: 
Tournaments
Public Sector
Teacher Merit Pay
Matched School-Student Data
JEL: 
I21
M52
I28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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