Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296507 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
AWI Discussion Paper Series No. 746
Publisher: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
In this paper, we experimentally investigate how sending a signal of following social norms impacts people's cooperative behavior in a repeated public goods game, where we disentangle the effect of strategy and internalization of social norms on cooperation. We find that under the signaling mechanism, less cooperative players disguise themselves in the rule-following game, but this does not decrease cooperation overall. More importantly, the signaling mechanism has a heterogeneous effect on cooperation in rule-following and rule-breaking groups: It increases cooperation in rule-following groups but decreases cooperation in rule-breaking groups. Finally, the signaling mechanism tends to offset the decline of contributions among participants in rule-breaking groups rather than rulefollowing groups. Overall, this paper provides a feasible way to improve social cooperation and enriches the literature on cooperation in the public goods game.
Subjects: 
public goods game
cooperation
signaling
internalization of social norms
JEL: 
C40
C92
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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