Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296836 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1191
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We examine how contract type influences the relationship between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the contracts between the supplier and fringe retailers are contingent on the bargaining outcome between the supplier and the dominant retailer, the bargaining power does not affect the retail price. In contrast, if contracts with fringe retailers are not contingent, the relationship between bargaining power and retail price can be either positive or negative.
Schlagwörter: 
Countervailing power
Buyer power
Dominant retailer
Two-part tariff
Contin-gent contract
JEL: 
L13
D43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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