Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296859 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1216
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce behavioral diversity to an otherwise standard signaling model, in which a fraction of agents choose their signaling actions according to an exogenous distribution. These behavioral agents provide opportunities for strategic low-type agents to successfully emulate higher types in equilibrium, which in turn reduces the cost for strategic high-type agents to separate from lower types. Behavioral diversity thus improves the equilibrium payoffs to all types of strategic agents. The model also exhibits a convergence property which is intuitively more appealing than the least-cost separating equilibrium of the standard setting.
Schlagwörter: 
least-cost separating equilibrium
insensitivity to prior
behavioral diversity
equilibrium emulation
JEL: 
D82
Z13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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