Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296864 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1221
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on Nash program by experimentally comparing the results of "structured" (non-cooperative) demand-based and offer-based mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an ex-ante equilibrium outcome with the results of corresponding "semi-structured" (cooperative) bargaining procedures. A significantly higher frequency of the grand coalition formation, the higher efficiency, and the allocation belonging to the bargaining set is observed in the latter than in the former regardless of whether it is demand-based or an offer-based. While significant differences in the resulting allocations are observed between the two non-cooperative mechanisms, little difference is observed between the two cooperative procedures.
Subjects: 
Nash Program
Bargaining procedures
Shapley value
JEL: 
C70
C71
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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