Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296940 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2023:4
Publisher: 
Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy (IFAU), Uppsala
Abstract: 
We exploit a sharp birthday discontinuity in a large and universal Swedish cash transfer program, creating plausibly exogenous variation in the default disbursement option, while holding entitlements and other financial incentives constant. When the cash transfer is paid out to the mother by default, instead of a 50/50 default, it has a huge effect on the probability that the transfer is deposited in the mother's bank account also in the long run. Surprisingly, we find that the default policy redistributes resources to separated low-income mothers. We find no indications that the 100%-to-the-mother default induces mothers to work less or to take more responsibility for the children.
Subjects: 
Gender targeting
family transfers
default
child allowance
gender equality
JEL: 
J12
H31
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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