Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/297256 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1460
Publisher: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Abstract: 
We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.
Subjects: 
Multi-unit auction
single-unit demand
uniform pricing
pay-asbid
asymmetric information
publicity effect
JEL: 
C72
D44
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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