Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/297708 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Intereconomics [ISSN:] 1613-964X [Volume:] 59 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 112-118
Publisher: 
Sciendo, Warsaw
Abstract: 
In April 2023, the European Commission issued a directive proposal on EU economic governance reform. The Council cut some tasks of Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs) that were in the Commission directive proposal; whether this cutting is justified is an open question. Early this year, the Council and the Parliament reached a provisional agreement on the proposed reform of the EU economic governance framework. The vision of the Commission that would involve IFIs in the assessment of fiscal-structural plans is not groundless. But structural reforms and investment analysis demand expertise that hardly exists in most national IFIs, and their involvement in policy design could be perceived as a technocratic inroad into democratic decision-making. In order to play a more significant and effective role, national IFIs need adequate resources and enhanced analytical capacity; their activity depends heavily on the policy design of the EU economic governance. National IFIs should view their role from a macroprudential perspective, too. The role of IFIs should not go beyond what most of them can deliver effectively, so that their status and reputation are not harmed.
JEL: 
E62
F15
H61
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.