Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/297785 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 856
Verlag: 
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA), Buenos Aires
Zusammenfassung: 
The central hypothesis of this article is that liability regulation can foster firms' incentives to study the (potential) dangers of their products. We discuss alternative views and develop a formal model to analyze a firm's incentive structure under the application of hindsight liability. We find a new role for liability regulation: to foster voluntary investment in research aimed at detecting potential risks in new products. The model allows us to analyze the firm's investment decisions in research under different scenarios, each of which has varying expected costs. We offer some alternatives for institutional design seeking incentive compatibility with the aim proposed.
Schlagwörter: 
risk
regulation
product liability
incentives
asymmetric information
JEL: 
K12
K22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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