Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/297961 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Central Bank Review (CBR) [ISSN:] 1303-0701 [Volume:] 23 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 100117 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1-15
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
This paper is motivated by the implementation of the new banking supervision structure in the European Union (EU) and the possible conflict of interest between monetary policy and the supervision authority within the European Central Bank (ECB). The empirical analysis considers the relationship between the structure of banking supervision and the compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCP) for effective supervision. A sample of 21 countries and the Euro Area (EA) is used. In addition to the structure of bank supervision, a list of independent variables is considered to explain the dependent variable. The results suggest that the supervisory structure has no statistical significance at any notable significance level on compliance with the BCP. On the contrary, financial freedom is a statistically significant variable.
Subjects: 
Banking supervision
Basel core principles compliance
Central banking
Euro area
European central bank
Single supervisory mechanism
JEL: 
C10
C50
E52
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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