Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/298016 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2024-009/I
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
We investigate experimentally how the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes of women. Female participants negotiate in an unstructured bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information about the allocation of a surplus ('pie size'). We find that the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and that the effects depend on players' information. Players who are informed about the pie size are less compromising during ovulation and receive higher payoffs conditional on reaching an agreement. Uninformed players achieve higher final payoffs during ovulation, which is mainly driven by higher agreement rates. Our study provides first evidence that biological factors affect bargaining.
Subjects: 
bargaining
asymmetric information
menstrual cycle
biological factors
JEL: 
C78
C91
D87
J16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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