Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/298028 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2024-021/II
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based on exogenous player weights. We characterize the family of all weighted-egalitarian values by employing the standard axioms of efficiency and linearity, in addition to two novel axioms: ω-ratio invariance for symmetric players and symmetry in weights. We then show that relaxing linearity to additivity and adding coalitional monotonicity results in a subfamily of affine combinations of equal division and weighted division values. Furthermore, using an axiom called monotonicity in weights, we characterize the family of convex combinations of equal division and weighted division values.
Subjects: 
cooperative game
axiomatization
equal division value
weighted division value
equality
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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