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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 121
Verlag: 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
I show that parents select schools by considering attributes of the student-school match that improve the learning outcomes beyond average school quality. Using the centralized algorithm for offers to primary school in London, I compare the achievement of students who are as good as randomly enroled in schools ranked differently in their application. Enroling at the most-preferred school versus an institution ranked lower increases achievement by 0.10 SD beyond school value-added among students with similar characteristics. Only a small part of the match effects of parental choice can be explained by student's characteristics such as gender, ability, or socioeconomic status.
Schlagwörter: 
Centralised assignment
Deferred acceptance
School choice
School effectiveness
JEL: 
H75
I21
I24
I28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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