Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/298421 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
EHES Working Paper No. 227
Publisher: 
European Historical Economics Society (EHES), s.l.
Abstract: 
Can autocratic governments gain support by implementing a welfare reform and a repressive law? This paper studies a famous case - Bismarck's policies of social insurance and the antisocialist law in late 19th century Germany. The socialist party, I find, increases its vote share in constituencies more affected by Bismarck's policies. For identification, I exploit local and industry-specific variation in treatment intensity due to ex-ante existing local healthcare and detailed lists on forbidden socialist organizations. This variation allows me to use a flexible difference-in-differences as well as a shift-share approach. As mechanisms, I highlight that the socialist party evaded the repression by reallocating their activity and gained from the social insurance by claiming the credits for the welfare reform and providing a local cooperative alternative.
Subjects: 
welfare reform
repression
social democracy
opposition
voting,autocracy
JEL: 
D74
N44
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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