Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/298982 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice [ISSN:] 2336-9205 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] S1 [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 125-164
Publisher: 
Sciendo, Warsaw
Abstract: 
This paper maps Leeper and Walker (2011) model into a game theory framework to study about the strategic aspects of monetary and fiscal interaction under a fiscal stress caused by an ageing population problem. The paper reveals that the outcomes of the game depend on the parameters of the underlying model, the size of the projected transfers and the public inflation expectation. The findings show that commitment to the target (inflation, government transfers) plays a crucial role in the policy interaction.
Subjects: 
Monetary-fiscal interaction
Game theory
Ageing population
Dynamic leadership
Stochastic timing
JEL: 
E63
C70
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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