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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17034
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the relation between the wage and amenity components of compensation under collective bargaining. Using the universe of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) in Brazil, I augment information on workers' wages with the comprehensive set of amenities codified in the text of these contracts. I then estimate the effects of increasing union bargaining power with a difference-in-difference strategy that leverages 1) a judicial decision that prevented the expiration of existing CBA provisions—a policy known as ultractivity—and 2) gaps in CBA coverage across establishments when the policy was enacted. I find that boosting union power causes an increase in both wages and CBA clauses without a subsequent decrease in employment. A revealed preference approach to estimating the wage-equivalent value of negotiated clauses shows that amenity value also increases, comprising approximately 45% of workers' total gains in compensation. Results are consistent with collective bargaining functioning as a labor market institution that counters monopsony power, but where employers retain the right-to-manage the composition of their workforce.
Schlagwörter: 
collective bargaining
unions
amenities
compensating differentials
JEL: 
J52
J32
J42
K31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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