Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300149 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 1194
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a new model of mixed oligopoly where a workers' cooperative firms competes with a number of profit maximising companies. Building upon a large empirical evidence, we innovate as compared to the traditional literature on the objective function of the cooperative; moreover, its membership is treated as endogenous in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We show which factors may be responsible of the degeneration of the workers' cooperative firms, which occurs when the number of members shrinks with respect to the overall employees.
Schlagwörter: 
cooperatives
mixed oligopoly
degeneration
JEL: 
L21
L25
P13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
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